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Abstract: Many recent papers have studied movements in stock, bond, and currency 
prices over short windows of time around macro announcements. This paper adds to the 
announcement effects literature in two ways.  First, we study the joint announcement 
effects across a broad range of assets--exchange rates and U.S. and foreign term 
structures.  In order to evaluate whether the joint effects can be reconciled with 
conventional theory, we interpret the joint movements in light of uncovered interest rate 
parity or changes in risk premia.  For several real macro announcements, we find that a 
stronger than expected release appreciates the dollar today, but that it must either (i) 
lower the relative risk premium for holding foreign currency rather than dollars, or (ii) 
imply considerable future expected dollar depreciation.  The latter implies an 
overshooting behavior akin to that described by Dornbusch (1976).  Second, we use a 
longer span of high frequency data than has been common in announcement work.  A 
longer span of high frequency data contributes to the precision of our estimates and 
allows us to explore the possibility that the effects of macro surprises on asset prices have 
varied over time.  We find evidence, for example, that PPI releases had a larger effect on 
U.S. interest rates before about 1992 than subsequently. 
 
Keywords:  Data Releases, Exchange Rates, Uncovered Interest Parity, Overshooting. 
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1. Introduction 
The study of high frequency asset price movements has examined the relationships 
among the unexpected component of macroeconomic announcements and various asset 
returns.  This paper contributes to the literature in two ways.  First, we consider the joint 
effects of U.S. macro announcements on exchange rates and U.S. and foreign interest 
rates of various maturities.   Most prior work has considered announcement effects on a 
single asset or asset class.  The interpretations these papers place on measured effects 
generally have implications about how other asset prices should have reacted to the 
announcement.  For example, Anderson, Bollerslev, Diebold and Vega’s (2003a) 
(hereafter, ABDV) excellent study of the reaction of exchange rates to macro 
announcements finds that an announcement of U.S. retail sales that is greater than 
expected is associated with an appreciation of the dollar.  This can be reconciled with 
conventional exchange rate theory, e.g., the monetary model, if the announcement 
portends higher-than-expected U.S. income, but this should also be reflected in a rise in 
U.S. interest rates.  Studying the joint behavior of a broad range of asset returns allows us 
to shed additional light on the market reaction to news.  
 A second significant contribution of this paper is the use of a longer span of high 
frequency intradaily data than used in most other papers.  Our sample includes data from 
1987 to  2002, a period including 2 NBER recessions.  Earlier work covers a much 
smaller time period.  For example, ABDV’s sample is January 1992 to December 1998, a 
period in which the U.S. economy was always in an expansion phase.  Fleming and 
Remolona (1997), in their study of bond returns, use a 1-year sample starting in mid-
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1993.  A longer sample period including a broader range of states of the economy should 
contribute to sharper conclusions.   
 One reason for the short samples in earlier work is the limited availability of 
intradaily data.  In estimating the effect of an announcement, it is desirable to measure 
the asset price changes in a narrow window around the time of the macro announcement.  
If we choose a window that is narrow enough, the information hitting the market during 
the window should be dominated by the macro announcement; thus, the events in the 
narrow window provide us an approximate natural experiment. Earlier work has shown 
that the average effect of announcements is completed very quickly, so that confining 
attention to a 20-minute window around the time of the announcement should be more 
than adequate.  Especially for highly variable asset prices such as foreign exchange, using 
daily changes, which include the effect of announcements and all other information 
hitting the market that day, leads to very imprecise estimates of the announcement 
effects.  Nonetheless, many papers in the literature on announcement effects use daily 
data instead because long spans of intradaily data were not available until recently.1   
 It has proven very difficult to link asset price movements to macroeconomic 
fundamentals, but this is especially true for exchange rates (Meese and Rogoff (1983)).  
The systematic relationship between the surprise component of macroeconomic data 
releases and one-day exchange rate changes is weak and hard to detect (Hardouvelis 
                                                          
1 The literature measuring the effects of macro announcements on asset prices at daily or intradaily 
frequency is vast and includes Dornbusch (1980), Schwert (1981), Frenkel (1981), Edwards (1982), 
Cornell (1983), Pearce and Roley (1983), Frankel and Engel (1984), Ito and Roley (1987), Hardouvelis 
(1988), Cutler, Poterba and Summers (1989), McQueen and Roley (1993), Ederington and Lee (1993), 
Edison (1997), Fleming and Remolona (1997, 1999), Almeida, Goodhart and Payne (1998), Bollerslev, Cai 
and Song (2000), Clare and Courtney (2001), Kuttner (2001), Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2002), Gurkaynak, 
Sack and Swanson (2003) and Bernanke and Kuttner (2003).  Some of these papers also document a 
systematic relationship between the announcements and the conditional variance of asset returns. 
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(1988) and Edison (1997)).  That is what makes the work of ABDV such a major 
contribution because it is able to pin down precisely estimated relations between 
macroeconomic surprises and exchange rate returns by using high frequency intradaily 
data. 
 Fair (2003) is work closely related to this paper as it too considers high frequency 
intradaily data on a range of asset prices over a long period (1982 to 1999).  He identifies 
occasions on which the five-minute change in stock prices, bond prices or exchange rates 
exceeded 0.75 percentage points, and then conducts newswire searches to identify an 
important event that occurred at that time.  An event can be identified in many (though 
not all) cases, and this event is often a U.S. macroeconomic announcement.  Fair lists 
these events and studies the correlations of changes in stock prices, bond prices and 
exchange rates around these events.  This supports the view that U.S. macro 
announcements are important determinants of asset prices in a narrow window around the 
time of the release.  While Fair studies large events, we study the average effects of all 
announcements on changes in interest rates and exchange rates. 
We follow most of the macro announcements literature in focusing on the 
“surprise” component of the announcements.  We study 10 announcements of U.S. 
indicators: CPI, PPI, Fed Funds target, GDP, unemployment rate, initial unemployment 
claims, housing starts, nonfarm payrolls, retail sales, and trade balance.  For most 
releases, we measure the surprise component as the difference between the actual release 
and the Money Market Services (MMS) survey expectation.  For the FOMC 
announcement about the target Fed Funds rate, we follow Kuttner (2001) in taking the 
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expected change from the Fed Funds futures market.  We discuss possible limitations of 
MMS surveys and Fed Funds futures data as sources of expectations data below. 
We obtain significant and quite precisely estimated effects for several 
macroeconomic releases on exchange rates and the term structure of U.S. and foreign 
interest rates.  Stronger than expected real releases (e.g. nonfarm payrolls, retail sales, 
GDP) tend to appreciate the dollar and raise short and long-term interest rates in the U.S. 
and, to a lesser extent, overseas.  Higher than expected inflation (CPI or PPI) is estimated 
to have little effect on the exchange rate, but to raise U.S. interest rates significantly.  
Tighter than expected monetary policy (i.e. a higher than expected target Fed Funds rate) 
is estimated to appreciate the dollar and to raise the term structure of U.S. interest rates.  
The effect on the 10-year U.S. interest rate is more precisely estimated and smaller than 
Kuttner (2001) obtained with a very similar methodology, but using daily data. 
For the most part our point estimates for individual asset returns are quite similar 
to those of earlier work including ABDV (exchange rates, intradaily data), Ederington 
and Lee (1993) (exchange rates and U.S. interest rates, intradaily data), Fleming and 
Remolona (1997, 1999) (U.S. interest rates, intradaily data), Kuttner (2001) (U.S. interest 
rates, daily data) and Gurkaynak, Sack and Swanson (2003) (forward U.S. interest rates, 
daily data).2  Compared to work where only daily data has been used our inference is 
more precise and our results sometimes give a different picture. 
Our main goal of characterizing the joint movements of exchange rates and 
interest rate term structures presents a bit of a presentational challenge.  Uncovered 
interest rate parity (UIP) is a convenient starting point.  We know that UIP does not hold 
                                                          
2 Gurkaynak, Sack and Swanson (2003) and Clare and Courtenay (2001) also consider the effect of UK 
macro announcements on UK interest rates.  
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unconditionally:  there seems to be a highly variable risk premium reflected in the joint 
movements of interest differentials and exchange rates.  However, as an interpretational 
device we can assume that the announcements do not change the risk premium, in which 
case our estimated effects imply a trajectory of the exchange rate response to the macro 
news.   If the trajectory is difficult to reconcile as an expected path of the exchange rate, 
one can reason about what must have happened to the risk premium.  We investigate the 
implied risk premium behavior under the assumption that exchange rate expectations are 
consistent with a random walk model.   
For several real macro releases, such as nonfarm payrolls, we find that a stronger 
than expected release appreciates the dollar today, and that it either (i) lowers the risk 
premium for holding foreign rather than dollar-denominated assets, or (ii) implies future 
expected dollar depreciation in excess of the original jump.  If one were to assert that a 
stronger-than-expected U.S. release raises the risk premium for holding foreign rather 
than dollar-denominated assets, our results imply that this could only be consistent with 
an even steeper path of expected dollar depreciation following the initial appreciation. 
We find that higher-than-expected CPI and PPI releases also lower the foreign 
exchange risk premium and/or lead to significant long-run expected dollar depreciation. 
After the first version of this paper was written, we became aware of independent 
concurrent related work by Anderson, Bollerslev, Diebold and Vega (2003b).  They 
consider the effect of the unexpected component of macroeconomic announcements on a 
wide range of international asset returns, including exchange rates, US and foreign stocks 
and bonds.  The set of assets they consider is different from those in this paper.  We do 
not include any stock returns, but, unlike Anderson, Bollerslev, Diebold and Vega, do 
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include short term interest rate futures and so consider the effects of macro 
announcements on US and foreign interest rates of a range of different maturities.  This in 
turn motivates our analysis of the effect of announcements on the trajectory of expected 
future exchange rates and/or UIP risk premia.  Our dataset also covers a longer time span.  
For example, our high frequency data on foreign interest rates goes from 1989 or earlier 
up to the end of 2002, whereas theirs covers the period July 1998 to the end of 2002 only. 
 The plan for the remainder of this paper is as follows.  Section 2 contains some 
theoretical discussion of the interpretation of a regression of high frequency asset returns 
on the unexpected component of macroeconomic announcements.  Section 3 describes 
the data.  Section 4 contains the basic regression results.  Section 5 contains the analysis 
of the effects of surprises on expected future exchange rates and the UIP risk premium, 
that we can obtain only by studying the simultaneous responses of interest differentials 
and exchange rates to the data releases.  Tests for parameter stability and models 
allowing for time-varying parameters are reported in section 6.  Section 7 concludes. 
  
2. Theory On the High Frequency Response of Asset Prices to Announcements 
The starting point of the announcements literature is the following regression, 
 t t tr sβ ε= +  
where tr  is the change in an asset return in a small time window (say, 20 minutes) around 
a macro announcement, say for the CPI, and ts  is the surprise component of the CPI 
announcement.  Obviously, β  then measures the typical effect of the inflation surprise.  
The hope is that by focusing on a narrow time window, we get something like a natural 
 7
experiment allowing us to learn the effects of a particular type of information.  Although 
this approach is standard, there has been little analysis of just what the natural experiment 
is that we are studying.  
 In this section we present a simple framework within which to interpret this 
regression.  While the assumptions are heroic, such assumptions are required to motivate 
the fixed-coefficient, linear model that a natural starting point for this sort of work.  The 
bottom line is that the β  in the basic regression should be interpreted as a linear 
combination of the effects of every kind of fundamental shock in the economy where the 
weights have the interpretation as Kalman gain coefficients.  We provide further 
interpretation below. 
 Suppose there is a state variable tf  describing all variables in the economy that 
can be viewed as fixed in any 20 minute period.  This includes the capital stock, the level 
of productivity, non-auction market prices, and so on.  Let tˆf  denote the public’s current 
view of this state.3   The equilibrium auction price of an asset, tp , is a function of tf  and 
tˆf  so that we can write ˆ( , )t t tp f fφ= .  Now linearize this system around 0 0ˆ( , )f f  giving,  
 ' '0 0 1 0 2 0ˆ ˆ ˆ( , ) ( ) ( )t t tp f f f f f fφ φ φ≈ + − + −  
where 1
tf
δφφ δ=  and 2 tˆf
δφφ δ= .  Next time difference this equation over a 20 minute 
interval: 
                                                          
3 Notice that if we are modeling the world as with a representative agent economy, for the purposes of an 
announcement effects paper, it must be an agent that does not know her own income or productivity.  This 
is required because when data on income for a period ending several weeks earlier comes out, it affects 
markets.  Similarly, inflation data for earlier periods affect the markets; thus, the agent does not know all 
past prices. The agents may know some elements of the state variable with certainty, but generally we 
allow all of them to be uncertain. 
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 ' ' '1 1 2 1 2 1ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) ( ) ( )t t t t t t tp f f f f f fφ φ φ− − −∆ ≈ − + − = −  
where the second step comes from the fact that 1 0t tf f −− =  in the 20 minute window.  
Now take the conditional expectation of this expression conditional on 1tˆf −  and ts , a one 
dimensional information variable that is the only information arriving between 1t −  and 
t . Computing this expectation requires assumptions about how ts  affects tˆf .  If all 
variables are covariance stationary and Gaussian, the effect of ts  on tˆf  will be given by 
the standard Kalman updating so that 
 1






−− =  
where g is the Kalman gain.  Making the substitutions gives, 
 '1 1 2ˆ[ | , ]t t t t tE p f s gsφ− −∆ ≈  
Thus, we have that '2gβ φ= : β  is a linear combination of price effects associated with a 
shock to public understanding of every state variable.  These effects are collected in 2φ .  
The weights, given by g , indicate how much the particular announcement in question 
tends to reveal about each state variable. 
 Suppose that ts  is an inflation announcement and it comes in surprisingly low.  
One might deduce that productivity is greater than anticipated, that monetary policy will 
be looser in the future than previously thought, that the capital stock is bigger than 
previously thought, or that any other state variable is slightly different from what was 
previously thought (e.g., Alaskan oil reserves).  We presumably think that it contains 
more information about, say, productivity, than about Alaskan oil reserves, implying that 
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the Kalman gain associated with productivity is much larger than the Kalman gain on oil 
reserves.  These gains then get multiplied by the effect of the state variable on prices to 
give the full effect of the shock. 
 What this exercise demonstrates is that while we have a sort of natural 
experiment, it is not a simple one.  Interpreting the slope coefficientβ  involves telling 
stories about both how a given shock affects views of the state variables but also about 
how those state variables affect the economy. 
 This analysis differs from some implicit analysis in other papers.  For example, 
some early papers reasoned from the fact that because income and other state variables 
are fixed within the window, the movement in the shock could not be due to revisions in 
income.  We think this is incorrect:  it can be due revisions in the agent's view of income, 
productivity or the capital stock.  Some analyses implicitly proceed as if we know that 
certain of the Kalman gain coefficients are large and that others are trivially small.  
Without such an assumption, there is no clear interpretation of any of the announcements.  
For example, the model Frankel and Engel (1984) use to illustrate exchange rate jumps in 
response to money supply announcements is based on the assumption that the money 
announcements shed no light on income and are informative only about future Fed 
policy. 
 Our approach makes clear that the linear, fixed coefficient approach rests on 
strong assumptions and motivates us to consider time variation in the effects of macro 
announcements on asset prices in section 6 below.  With our long sample of high 
frequency data, spanning two recessions, we can shed light on such questions that we 
could not hope to answer with adequate precision using shorter samples.  To take a 
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specific case that may have been of relevance in the 1990s, if lower-than-expected 
inflation is perceived to be evidence of weak demand, then agents might expect monetary 
policy to be loosened, causing interest rates to fall and the dollar to depreciate.  But, if the 
unexpectedly low inflation is perceived to be evidence of productivity growth, then in 
some models U.S. interest rates rise and the dollar appreciates.4  
 
3. The Data 
3.1 The announcement surprises 
We consider the effects on exchange rates and interest rates of 10 macroeconomic 
announcements, plus the FOMC day release of the decision about the target Federal 
Funds rate, as listed in Table 1.  Nine of the announcements occur at 8:30am Eastern 
time; the target Fed Funds rate is released at 2:15pm Eastern time.5  The timing of the 
8:30am macroeconomic announcements is extremely precise, while the Fed’s decision 
about the target Fed Funds rate has been announced on the FOMC day within a couple of 
minutes of 2:15pm since March 1995.6 
 For the 8:30 announcements, we measure the expected announcement using the 
median survey expectation from Money Market Services.  The data come from the MMS 
survey of money managers taken the Friday before the release of the data.  These survey 
                                                          
4 See Glick and Rogoff (1995) and Erceg, Guerrieri and Gust (2002) for more discussion of the impact of 
productivity growth on real exchange rates and the trade balance.  The latter paper argues that agents 
initially viewed the productivity acceleration in the U.S. in the 1990s as being transitory, but then came to 
believe that it represented a break in the trend growth rate of productivity.  They back this up with survey 
evidence.  In a dynamic general equilibrium model, they show that this can account for much of the 
deterioration of the U.S. trade balance, and the real appreciation of the dollar.  
5 Many other countries, including Germany, do not release macroeconomic data at precise scheduled times. 
6 From February 1994 to March 1995, the FOMC decision was explicitly announced, but at varying times.  
Prior to February 1994 it was not explicitly announced at all, but rather had to be inferred from the Desk’s 
subsequent activity.  
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data have been widely used and the properties have been much studied.  They are 
generally found to possess reasonable properties as expectations series, as they are 
unbiased, pass simple forecast rationality tests, and outperform naive time series forecasts 
(see, for example, Balduzzi, Elton and Green (2001)).  We measure the surprise 
component of the announcement as the actual data release less the MMS survey 
expectation.  Our sample runs from January 1987 through December 2002, though for 
some of the announcements, the MMS data do not go all the way back to the start of our 
sample: in these cases we just use the data as far back as possible.  Data availability and 
the units in which the data are recorded are noted in Table 1. 
 We handle the target Federal Funds rate differently.  Although MMS records 
survey expectations for the target Fed Funds rate, we instead measure the surprise 
component of the Fed’s decision from intradaily changes in Federal Funds futures.  We 
do this by the following algorithm, which is an adaptation of that proposed by Kuttner 
(2001) for daily data.  If the FOMC meeting is on or before the 22nd of the month, take 
the change in the current month Fed Funds futures price from 2:10 to 2:30 and scale the 
change by the ratio of the total number of days in the month to the total number of days 
left in the month, to obtain the surprise change in the target Fed Funds rate.  This scaling 
is necessary because the contract settles to the average interest rate in the month. If the 
FOMC meeting is on or after the 23rd of the month, we measure the surprise change in 
the target Fed Funds rate as the change in the next month Fed Funds futures price from 
2:10 to 2:30.7  The Fed Funds futures give a better measure of expectations of target Fed 
                                                          
7 The reason for using the next month futures price change rather than the scaled change in the current 
month futures price change is because the data are recorded only to the nearest basis point (half basis point 
since 1995), so our measured surprise change has rounding error that would be exacerbated by the scaling. 
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Funds rate changes than MMS survey expectations in the sense that in a regression of the 
actual realized target Fed Funds rate on the forecasts from the futures market and the 
MMS survey forecast, the coefficient on the futures rate is not significantly different from 
one, while the coefficient on the survey forecast is not significantly different from zero. 
3.2 Exchange Rate Data 
Our exchange rate data consist of the 5-minute exchange rate returns for dollar exchange 
rates versus the DM/euro and pound, covering the entire calendar years 1987 to 2002 
inclusive, from Olsen and Associates.8  To construct these data, Olsen and Associates 
record all Reuters quotes, average the bid and ask, and then linearly interpolate the 
resulting series to get prices at exactly the required times. 
From these data, we construct exchange rate returns over 20-minute windows 
starting 5 minutes before the data release, and ending 15 minutes after the data release.   
For an 8:30 data release, we construct exchange rate returns from 8:25 to 8:45.9   For an 
FOMC release, we construct exchange rate returns from 2:10 to 2:30. 
Throughout this paper, we construct exchange rates as dollars per unit foreign 
currency, so that a positive exchange rate return represents an appreciation of the foreign 
currency against the dollar.  The exchange rate returns are continuously compounded, and 
multiplied by 10,000, so they can be interpreted as (approximately) the exchange rate 
change in basis points. 
                                                          
8 This consists of the HFDF2000 dataset covering the years 1987 to 1998, with an extension through the 
end of 2002, also purchased from Olsen. 
9 We could simply use exchange rate returns from the moment of the announcement until 5 minutes later, 
but do not for two reasons.  First, although ABDV find that the response of exchange rates to 
macroeconomic announcements is fast, for some announcement-currency pairs they find that the full effect 
on the conditional mean takes a little more than 5 minutes.  Second, since the data are based on linearly 
interpolated quotes, the exchange rate data for 8:30 may incorporate a quote that came after an 8:30 release.  
Taking exchange rate returns from 8:25 to 8:45 effectively circumvents this problem. 
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3.3 Interest Rate Data 
Our interest rate data consist of tick-by-tick transactions prices for Federal Funds futures, 
3-month Eurodollar, euromark/euribor and sterling libor futures contracts, 10 year 
Treasury bond futures, and 10 year UK and German bond futures going back to the late 
1980s.  The exact dates for which we have data on each of these instruments are shown in 
Table 2.  We obtained U.S. futures data from Genesis, and foreign futures data from the 
London International Financial Futures Exchange (LIFFE) and the EUREX Exchange in 
Frankfurt. 
 Federal funds futures trade at the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT).  There is a 
contract for every month.  The settlement price for each contract is the average effective 
Fed Funds rate for that month.  Contracts trade for each of about the next 8 months, but 
only the first few contracts are liquid. Eurodollar contracts trade at the Chicago 
Mercantile Exchange (CME).  There is a contract for settlement in March, June, 
September and December of each year.  The settlement price for each contract is simply 
the 3-month eurodollar deposit rate on the settlement day.  Ten year Treasury bond 
futures trade on CBOT.  Again, there is a contract for settlement in March, June, 
September and December of each year.  Euromark/euribor and sterling libor contracts 
trade on LIFFE.  They are similar to eurodollar contracts, except that they settle to 
mark/euro and sterling 3-month interest rates.  The 10 year UK and German bond futures 
also trade on LIFFE and are similar to 10 year Treasury bond futures.  Since 1999, 
liquidity in German bond futures has switched to EUREX and we use EUREX data for 
German bond futures instead. 
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 Trading in interest rate futures opens on CME and CBOT at 7:20am Central 
Time, so all of the futures are trading at 8:30am Eastern time.  All of the US contracts are 
trading at 2:15pm Eastern Time, but LIFFE and EUREX are closed at this time. 
 From these data, we construct zero-coupon rates at maturities 3 months and 1-10 
years at 8:25am and 8:45 am, for the US, the UK and Germany, using the method 
described in the appendix.  We also construct zero-coupon rates at these maturities at 
2:10 and 2:30 for the US alone in the same way.  Hence we construct changes in zero-
coupon interest rates at these 11 different maturities in 20-minute windows starting 5 
minutes before the data release, and ending 15 minutes after the data release. 
 
4. Basic Regression Results 
For each of the 10 macroeconomic releases, we run regressions of exchange rate returns 
and interest rate changes over 20-minute windows around the time of the macroeconomic 
data release, tr , on the surprise component of the data release, ts .  As noted above, the 
basic regression is10  
 t t tr sβ ε= +  (1) 
While heteroskedasticity is not necessarily a first-order issue in these regressions, we use 
heteroskedasticity-robust White standard errors.  We note that the regressor ts  could well 
be affected by measurement error, biasing the estimated coefficient towards zero.  Indeed 
this concern motivates us to measure the surprise component of the target Fed Funds rate 
                                                          
10 Results including a constant are not substantially different, and are available from the authors on request.  
The regression could be specified to allow positive and negative surprises to have asymmetric effects.  The 
results for these regressions are available from the authors on request, but are not shown because there is 
only limited evidence of such asymmetry. 
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from intradaily futures rates rather than from MMS surveys, so as to avoid, or at least 
minimize, measurement error in this surprise. 
4.1 Results for Exchange Rate Returns 
In Table 3, we report the point estimates and the (uncentered) regression R-squared for 
the regression of each exchange rate return on each macroeconomic surprise.  These 
regressions are run only over the 20-minute windows around the time of the 
macroeconomic announcement: for the announcements that are made monthly this means 
that there is one observation per month.  The interpretation of the regression R-squared is 
the fraction of the variance of the exchange rate in that 20-minute window that is 
explained by the announcement, which is of course not at all the same thing as the 
fraction of the overall exchange rate variance that is explained by the announcement.   
 We have very similar qualitative results to ABDV, although our sample period is 
substantially longer than theirs.11  The announcements are such that positive surprises 
represent stronger-than-expected growth or higher-than-expected inflation.  For the 
unemployment rate and initial jobless claims, which are both countercyclical indicators, 
we flip the sign of the surprise so that positive surprises reflect stronger-than-expected 
growth for these indicators as well.  The point estimates in Table 3 generally indicate that 
stronger-than-expected announcements lead to negative exchange rate returns, i.e. dollar 
appreciation.  The effect is statistically significant for some, though not all, 
announcement-currency pairs.   The elements of Table 3 can be interpreted as the effect 
of a one unit surprise in the macroeconomic release on the exchange value of the dollar, 
                                                          
11 Note however that ABDV define exchange rates as foreign currency per dollar, whereas we define 
exchange rates as dollars per foreign currency, so their coefficient estimates are mostly positive.  Also note 
that ABDV normalize the macroeconomic surprises to have unit standard deviation, which we do not. 
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in basis points.  The point estimates are quite small -- for example if GDP12 comes out 
one percentage point above expectations (quarter-over-quarter, at an annualized rate), the 
estimated effect is to appreciate the dollar against the other currencies by only about 10 
basis points. 
Some announcements are more systematically related to exchange rates than 
others.  GDP, initial unemployment claims, nonfarm payrolls, retail sales, the trade 
balance, unemployment and the FOMC decision on the target Fed Funds rate are all 
significant at the 1% level for both currencies, with a surprise monetary policy easing 
being associated with dollar depreciation.  The R-squared (over the 20-minutes around 
announcements) is over 20% for some announcement-currency pairs.  Although such an 
association is weak, it is still a triumph by the dismal standards of modeling the 
relationship between exchange rates and macroeconomic fundamentals.   
4.2 Results for Interest Rate Changes 
We regress the changes in interest rates of different horizons on each macro surprise and 
plot the coefficients against the horizon of the interest rate in Figures 1 and 2.  These 
figures represent the effects of a one unit surprise in the U.S. macro announcement on the 
term structure of U.S. and foreign interest rates.   
 Stronger-than-expected releases tend to raise U.S. interest rates, including long-
term interest rates, and the effects are in many cases statistically significant.  Stronger-
than-expected U.S. releases also tend to raise foreign interest rates, although by a smaller 
amount. 
                                                          
12 In the United States, there are three releases of GDP during our sample period (aside from annual and 
benchmark revisions).  The advance release comes out about 1 month after the end of the quarter to which 
it refers.  The next two releases (called preliminary and final) are revisions that come out about 2 and 3 
months after the end of the quarter, respectively.  In our data analysis we are using just the advance release. 
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The effect of a shock to the Fed Funds rate on the term structure of interest rates 
is of special interest.  A great many papers have considered estimation of the effect of a 
change in the Fed Funds rate on the term structure of interest rates including Cook and 
Hahn (1989), Radecki and Reinhart (1994), Roley and Sellon (1995) and Kuttner (2001).  
The conventional view of the monetary policy transmission mechanism is that a shock to 
the Fed Funds rate affects consumption and investment demand through its effect on 
long-term interest rates.  If long-term interest rates are insensitive to shocks to the Fed 
Funds rate then monetary policy is either ineffective, or must work through other 
channels (Barth and Ramey (1991) or Bernanke and Gertler (1995)). 
Kuttner (2001) regresses one-day changes in the U.S. yield curve on the 
unexpected component of the change in the Federal Funds rate, as measured from daily 
closing prices in the Fed Funds futures market.  Our regression of the U.S. term structure 
on the unexpected component of the change in the Federal Funds rate is similar to that of 
Kuttner, but we use intradaily data both to measure the monetary policy surprise, and to 
measure the effect of the surprise on other interest rates. 
Our results are not inconsistent with those of Kuttner, but point to smaller and 
more precisely estimated effects of the monetary policy shock on long-term interest rates.  
Kuttner estimated that a 100 basis point unexpected tightening of monetary policy raises 
10-year yields by 31.5 basis points, with a standard error of 10.2 basis points.  When 
Kuttner includes FOMC days on which no change in rates actually occurred, the estimate 
falls to 22.0 basis points, with a standard error of 9.2 basis points.  Our estimate for the 
effect of a 100 basis point unexpected tightening in the Fed Funds rate on the 10-year 
U.S. interest rate is 13.3 basis points, with a standard error of 6.2 basis points.  These 
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very small estimates of the effects of monetary policy shocks on long-term interest rates 
are very close to those obtained by Roley and Sellon (1995) and Radecki and Reinhart 
(1994). 
In comparing our results with those of Kuttner (2001), note that we run our 
regression only over FOMC days since March 1995.  It is only for these announcements 
that the release came in a scheduled announcement at 2:15.  Demiralp and Jorda (2003), 
using daily data, report some evidence that the effect of monetary policy shocks on long-
term interest rates was higher before 1994 than subsequently, and is higher for 
intermeeting moves than for target Fed Funds rate surprises on FOMC days. 
4.3 Are Announcement Days Different? 
Our primary focus in this paper is on the effects of announcements on the conditional 
mean of asset prices, not their conditional variance.  But for our method in this paper to 
be reasonable, it should be that asset price changes are more variable during the 
announcement window than in otherwise comparable windows.  In Table 4, we report the 
standard deviation of intradaily exchange rate and interest rate changes over the 20 
minutes bracketing each of the 10 macroeconomic announcements, relative to the 
intradaily exchange rate or interest rate change over the same 20 minutes on days when 
there is no macroeconomic announcement at all in that time interval.  For example, the 
column of the table labeled CPI reports the standard deviation of exchange rate and 
interest rate changes between 8:25am and 8:45am on days when there is a CPI release 
divided by the standard deviation of the analogous changes between 8:25am and 8:45am 
on days when there is no 8:30am macro release at all.  The Fed Funds column reports the 
standard deviation of exchange rate and interest rate changes between 2:10pm and 
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2:30pm on FOMC days divided by the standard deviation of the analogous change at that 
time on non-FOMC days. 
 Most of the elements of this table are greater than 1, indicating that exchange 
rates and interest rates are indeed more volatile around announcements than at the same 
time on non-announcement days.  Releases of CPI, PPI, GDP, retail sales, the 
employment report and the target Fed Funds rate are all associated with substantially 
elevated volatility. 
 
5. The Simultaneous Effect of Surprises on Exchange Rates and Interest Rates.  
We next turn to studying the simultaneous effect of macroeconomic announcements on 
exchange rates and interest rates.  Consider the UIP relationship  
*
, ,t k t t k t kEe e i i+ − = −  
where ,t ki  (
*
,t ki ) is the domestic (foreign) k-period interest rate, te  is the log of the 
nominal exchange rate in home currency units per foreign, and E  denotes the time-t 
expectation.  Under rational expectations and risk-neutrality, a testable proposition is that 
in the regression 
 *, ,( )t k t k k t k t k te e i iα γ ε+ − = + − +  
kγ  should be equal to unity (and kα  equal to zero).  This is nearly uniformly rejected in 
the data, however, as kγ  is typically found to be negative, i.e., the currency with the 
higher interest rate typically appreciates (Engel, 1996).  A familiar interpretation of the 
empirical failure of UIP posits the existence of a time-varying risk premium, ,t kρ  such 
that 
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 *, , ,t k t t k t k t kEe e i i ρ+ − = − +  (2) 
This risk premium is the expected excess return that agents require to hold foreign rather 
than dollar-denominated bonds.  Equation (2) is simply a definition of the risk premium, 
which one may prefer to think of as the expected UIP deviation.  Of course, UIP does not 
hold, and the deviations from UIP, ,t kρ , are large and highly variable.   
 Consider the algebraic identity obtained from taking the difference in equation (2) 
from before to after the announcement 
 *, , ,ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆˆt k t t k t k t kEe e i i ρ+ = + − +  (3) 
where the hat denotes the change in the variable from just before to just after the 
announcement.  We can measure tˆe , ,tˆ ki  and 
*
,tˆ ki  directly.  From this we know 
,
ˆ ˆt k t kEe ρ+ − , but not each component separately.  If we make an assumption about either 
term, we can measure the other. 
We first assume that the macro announcements do not affect the risk premium 
(i.e. ,ˆ 0t kρ = ).  In this case, 
*
, ,
ˆ ˆ ˆˆt k t t k t kEe e i i+ = + −  
and we can immediately compute the effect of the announcement on the expected future 
exchange rate as the effect of the announcement on *, ,t t k t ke i i+ − .  We relate this in turn to 
the macro surprise by estimating the regression, 
 *, ,ˆ ˆtˆ t k t k k t te i i sβ ε+ − = +  (4) 
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Thus, under the assumption that the risk premium is unaffected by the macro 
announcement, the expected future exchange rate response to a one unit announcement 
surprise at horizon k is simply the coefficient kβ .   
In Figures 3 and 4 we plot the coefficients kβ  obtained from estimating equation 
(4) separately for k = 0, 3 months and 1-10 years (at horizon 0, equation (4) reduces to 
equation (1) and the conditional UIP assumption is not required).  These plots show the 
effect of a unit macro surprise on the expected future trajectory of exchange rates.  Also 
shown are 90% confidence intervals, obtained from heteroskedasticity-robust standard 
errors in (4). 
 For the real announcements, the general pattern is that a stronger than expected 
announcement appreciates the dollar.  But, assuming that the announcement does nothing 
to the UIP risk premium, this appreciation is not expected to last, and typically is 
expected to be more than reversed.  For example, a release of higher-than-expected 
nonfarm payrolls data causes a significant appreciation of the dollar today, but causes an 
expected depreciation in 10 years time.  This trajectory of exchange rates is akin to the 
overshooting described by Dornbusch (1976) for shocks to the money supply. 
 For the price indexes (CPI and PPI), assuming that the announcement does 
nothing to the UIP risk premium, the projection coefficients imply that a higher than 
expected inflation number leads to significant expected future dollar depreciation. 
 The assumption that the risk premium is not affected by the data release is 
questionable.   A second exercise that helps us to reason about the risk premium begins 
with assuming that exchange rate expectations are given by the random walk model at all 
 22
points in time.  Under this assumption, the effect of the announcement on ,t kρ  is given by 
the change in the interest differential *, ,ˆ ˆt k t ki i− .  Thus, we can estimate the effect of 
announcements on the risk premium by  regressing *, ,ˆ ˆt k t ki i−  on ts . 
 The effect of the U.S. macro announcement on the risk premium under the 
random walk assumption is plotted against the horizon in Figures 5 and 6; the risk 
premium is expressed at annualized rate.  Generally stronger-than-expected U.S. releases 
lead to significant and large declines in the risk premium. 
 Jointly, the two exercises lay out two possibilities.  Either stronger-than-expected 
real macro news leads to expectations of dollar depreciation in the long-run, or lead to 
declines in the required risk compensation for holding foreign rather than dollar 
denominated assets.  While we do not have good models for explaining empirically 
observed risk premia, one might have supposed that good macro news in the U.S. would 
raise the relative risk in owning foreign assets.13  If this were the case, even steeper dollar 
depreciation would be implied in the long-run.    
  The idea that a stronger-than-expected real U.S. data release that leads initially to 
dollar appreciation would then lead to long-term depreciation can be reconciled with 
theory.  The macro news could indicate higher relative real rates in the short-term (say, 
due to a policy response) but higher inflation and nominal rates in the long-term.  This is 
the story laid out by Gurkaynak, Sack and Swanson (2003) to account for their results 
regarding the effect of news on the U.S. term structure.  
                                                          
13 Note however that Alvarez, Atkeson and Kehoe (1999, 2003) propose a general equilibrium model in 
which agents have to pay a fixed cost to exchange money for assets.  In this model, a positive shock to U.S. 
money growth raises the U.S. inflation rate, induces more agents to pay the fixed cost and participate in 




6. Time Variation in Parameters 
With our dataset covering the years 1987 to 2002, which spans two NBER recessions, we 
can address questions that we could not hope to answer with adequate precision using 
shorter samples.  In particular, we can study time variation in the effect of 
macroeconomic releases on exchange rates and interest rates.  The effect of macro 
surprises could vary across the business cycle or other economic conditions (see, for 
example, Boyd, Jagannathan and Hu (2001), Orphanides (1992), David (1997), Veronesi 
(1999), David and Veronesi (2001) and Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2002)).  Tests of the 
null of parameter constancy in equation (1), using the structural stability test statistic 
proposed by Nyblom (1989), and using the sup-F statistic (the maximum value of the 
Chow statistic over all possible break dates) are reported in Tables 5 and 6, 
respectively.14 
 For most asset-announcement pairs, the hypothesis of parameter constancy is not 
rejected.  Time-variation in the effect of announcements on exchange rates and interest 
rates does not generally seem to be a first order issue.  There are however some notable 
exceptions.  The hypothesis of parameter constancy is rejected in the regression of 
exchange rate returns on trade balance surprises.15  The hypothesis of parameter 
constancy is rejected in the regression of U.S. interest rates on PPI, CPI and nonfarm 
payrolls surprises. 
                                                          
14 The null limiting distribution of this statistic was provided by Andrews (1993).  We exclude break dates 
in the first and last 15% of the sample (see Andrews (1993)). 
15 Rose (1984) and Irwin (1989) are two early papers examining this relationship. 
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 Given that the effects of certain pieces of macroeconomic news seem to vary over 
time, we next turn to modeling the relationship between macroeconomic surprises and 
exchange rates in models that allow for parameter instability. 
6.1 The Random Coefficient Regression Model 
A widely used statistical model that allows for time-variation in regression parameters is 
the random coefficient model of Rosenberg (1972), Cooley and Prescott (1973), and 
Watson and Engle (1983).  In the context of the regression of a change in interest rates or 
exchange rate returns on announcement surprises, the model can be written as 
 
1







= +  (5) 
Under an assumption of normality in the errors, the parameters of the model in equation 
(5) can be estimated by maximum-likelihood.16  Taking the maximum likelihood 
estimates as given, we can do inference on the unobserved state variable tβ  conditional 
on the entire sample, using the Kalman smoother, which also provides associated 
standard errors.  The smoothed coefficient estimates reflect our beliefs at the end of the 
sample period about what the responsiveness of the asset price to macroeconomic 
surprises was, at each point in time.  
 We applied this model to the effect of nonfarm payroll, PPI and trade balance 
surprises on exchange rates and interest rates.  We picked these three announcements, 
because there was some evidence of parameter instability in each of their effects.  The 
smoothed estimates of the effects of a surprise in nonfarm payrolls, PPI and the trade 
                                                          
16 See Harvey (1991). We initialize the Kalman filter with a diffuse prior. 
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balance are shown in Figures 7, 8 and 9, respectively.  Results for CPI (not shown) are 
quite similar to those for PPI. 
 In Figure 7, we see that the sensitivity of 3-month U.S. interest rates to nonfarm 
payrolls releases has declined since the early 1990s.  The sensitivity of the exchange rate 
response to nonfarm payrolls surprises peaked in the early 1990s and has declined since 
then. 
  In Figure 8, we see that the sensitivity of interest rates to PPI announcements was 
high in the early years of the sample, but then declined and is no longer significantly 
different from zero, for interest rates of any maturity.  This could reflect the interpretation 
of PPI news as conveying news about stronger-than-expected productivity growth, rather 
than demand strength, later in the sample.  
 In Figure 9, we see that the sensitivity of the exchange rate to news about the 
trade balance was very high in the early years of the sample, but it has subsequently 
waned and is no longer significantly different from zero.  Trade balance releases never 
had much effect on short term U.S. interest rates.  However, a lower than expected trade 
deficit was estimated to lead to a reduction in 10-year U.S. interest rates in the early part 
of the sample, but this effect has since waned too.  Indeed, the decline in the effect of 
trade balance surprises on 10-year yields mirrors the decline in its effect on the exchange 
value of the dollar. 
 An interpretation of this time variation in the effect of trade balance data is that in 
the 1980s and early 1990s, investors worried about the sustainability of the current 
account.  Higher than expected trade deficits would be interpreted as a sign that the 
current account deficit is unsustainable, leading to dollar depreciation.  It could also lead 
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to an increase in yields on 10-year government bonds as the U.S. would have to offer 
more attractive yields to continue to get foreigners to finance the deficit for a bit longer. 
 But, perhaps, beginning in the mid 1990s, investors started to think of the trade 
deficit as reflecting a positive country-specific productivity shock, as U.S. residents seek 
to smooth their consumption by borrowing from abroad in anticipation of higher future 
income.  Arguably, investors paid little attention to the possibility of a break in the trend 
growth rate of productivity until the mid-1990s.  At that point, however, they may well 
have begun to take seriously the idea of a break, and hence became more prone to 
interpret macroeconomic data surprises as conveying news about productivity.  If so, 
higher than expected trade deficits would be interpreted as positive productivity shocks 
that would, if anything, lead to dollar appreciation, by the Balassa-Samuelson effect. 
 
7. Conclusion 
Existing work on high frequency movements in asset prices has documented the 
relationship between macroeconomic announcements and asset returns around those 
announcements.  The literature has typically focused on a single asset or asset class, in 
isolation of other markets which theory predicts should move simultaneously.  Much of 
this work has used a relatively short sample period and/or calculated asset returns over 
fairly wide windows such as a day.   
In this paper we contribute to this literature by studying the joint behavior of 
exchange rates and zero coupon interest rates using a long span of high frequency data.  
We interpret the joint behavior of exchange rates and interest rates in the context of 
uncovered interest rate parity, thereby obtaining evidence on the interaction between UIP 
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risk premia and expected exchange rate dynamics, conditional on (U.S.) macro 
announcements.  Our work is not a test of UIP; rather, it characterizes combinations of 
risk premium and expected exchange rate dynamics in response to macro news that are 
consistent with the data. 
We find that for several real U.S. macro announcements better than expected 
news appreciates the dollar today, consistent with existing evidence.  From the responses 
of U.S. and foreign interest rate term structures, we are also able to infer that such 
releases either lower the risk premium for holding foreign currency or imply future 
expected dollar depreciation that exceeds the original appreciation.  While we do not 
have good models for explaining empirically observed risk premia, one might have 
supposed that good macro news in the U.S. would raise the relative risk in foreign assets.  
If it is implausible that stronger than expected U.S. news lowers the risk premium on 
foreign assets, then this could only be consistent with an even steeper path of expected 
dollar depreciation following the initial appreciation.  This would of course be 
inconsistent with a random walk formulation of expected exchange rate movements. 
Finally, there is some evidence of parameter instability for some announcements.  
Estimating models that allow for time varying parameters, we find that the effect of price 
surprises on interest rates has declined over our sample period and that the effect of trade 
balance surprises on exchange rates has also declined.  We also find some evidence for 




Appendix: Construction of Zero-Coupon Rates 
In this appendix, we describe how we constructed zero-coupon yield curves from interest 
rate and government bond futures.   
 We have high frequency data on the first four eurodollar, euromark/euribor  and 
sterling libor futures contracts.  These contracts are all cash-settled to 3-month interest 
rates on the settlement day.  By combining the prices on these short-term interest rate 
contracts, we obtain 3-month and 1-year zero-coupon rates. 
 We also have high frequency data on the prices of 10-year bond futures in the US, 
the UK and Germany.  These futures are nominally on 10-year bonds with a specific 
coupon rate (e.g. presently 6% for the CBOT 10-year contract).  More precisely, the 
futures contract is fulfilled by the party on the short side of the contract delivering any 
bond in a particular maturity range (e.g. presently 6.5 to 10 years for the CBOT 10-year 
contract) to the party on the long side of the contract at a price equal to the futures price 
multiplied by a conversion factor to adjust the actual coupon rate of the delivered bond to 
the nominal coupon rate of the futures contract (plus an adjustment for accrued interest).  
The party on the short side will choose the bond that is cheapest to deliver, comparing the 
price that she will receive for the bond relative to the value of the bond in the spot market 
at the time of settlement.  If interest rates are below the nominal coupon rate of the 
futures contract, the party on the short side will typically choose to deliver a bond at the 
short end of the maturity range, and vice-versa.  From CBOT, LIFFE and EUREX, we 
obtained data on the bond that was delivered for each futures contract (or the most 
commonly delivered bond in cases where multiple bonds were delivered).  We make the 
assumption that agents knew that this bond would be delivered, and treat the price of the 
front bond futures contract, multiplied by the conversion factor, as though it were the spot 
price of the bond that was in fact subsequently delivered in settlement of the contract. 
There exist bond contracts for settlement in March, June, September and December of 
each year.  Contracts trade for each of about the next 4 settlement dates, but only the first 
one or two contracts are liquid.  Moreover, liquidity in a bond futures contract decays 
sharply during the settlement month.  We therefore define the “front” bond futures 
contract to be the June contract in March, April and May alone, and similarly for the 
other contracts. 
 Notice that we treat the high frequency futures-based interest rates and bond 
prices (with a near settlement date) as though they are the underlying spot interest rates 
and bond prices.  Trading in short-term interest rate and bond futures markets is 
extremely liquid: liquidity in the bond futures market is far greater than in the market for 
any one specific bond issue.  The futures and spot instruments are very close substitutes.  
Besides, our cross-country long span of high frequency data is on futures instruments, not 
spot instruments.  In this sense we do not have a choice. 
 We fitted the following standard zero-coupon yield curve, used by Diebold and Li 
(2002), Nelson and Siegel (1987) and Siegel and Nelson (1988): 
 1 2 3
1 1( ) ( ) ( )t t t
e ey e
λτ λτ
λττ β β βλτ λτ
− −
−− −= + + −  
where ( )y τ  denotes the continuously-compounded zero-coupon yield of a bond with 
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maturity τ  and where 0.0609λ = .  The parameters 1tβ , 2tβ  and 3tβ  are time-varying 
and may be thought of as level, slope and curvature, respectively.  This zero curve 
implies a price for the delivered bond in the bond futures contract.  If the coupon 
payments on the delivered bond are at times 1 2, ,... mτ τ τ  (semiannual for the US and UK, 
annual for Germany), each coupon payment is of an amount c, and the bond is redeemed 
at par, p , on the date of the final coupon, then the price of the delivered bond should be 
 ( ) ( )1( ) j j m m
y ym
m jp ce pe
τ τ τ ττ − −== Σ +  
We solve for these parameters 1tβ , 2tβ  and 3tβ  at each point in time by simply requiring 
that ( )y τ  matches the 3 month and 1 year zero-coupon rates obtained from the short-term 
interest rate futures contracts and that ( )mp τ  matches the price of the bond futures 
contract (multiplied by the conversion factor for the delivered bond).  In this way, we 
have a set of three equations in three unknowns and can get an exact fit for the 
parameters of the zero-coupon yield curve.  We then simply compute the zero-coupon 
yield at the required maturities. 
 The structure of interest rate and bond futures contracts for the US, UK and 
Germany is remarkably similar, and so exactly the same methodology can be used for the 
US, UK and German zero-coupon yield curves.  It is to preserve cross-country 
comparability of methodology that we do not use prices of CBOT 5 year Treasury bond 
futures, even though we have these data too.  There is no comparable futures contract for 
UK bonds, and there is insufficient history of such a contract for German bonds. 
 This procedure for obtaining high frequency observations on a zero-coupon yield 
curve is far from ideal.  It effectively obtains the yield curve from just 3 points, which is 
fewer than is used in standard yield curve analysis (though can still identify level, slope 
and curvature).  It treats the interest rate and bond futures prices as though they were spot 
prices.  The party on the short side of the bond futures contract in fact has the option of 
choosing which bond to deliver, and the futures price incorporates the value of this 
optionality.  By assuming that the parties to the futures contract knew ahead of time 
which bond would in fact be delivered, we are neglecting this option value.  Also, our 
zero-coupon yield curve is neither a pure eurodollar nor a pure Treasury yield curve.  
Treasury and eurodollar interest rates are different because the latter incorporate some 
credit risk.  The spread between Treasury and eurodollar rates, known as the TED spread, 
reflects the premium for this credit risk, and is typically about 20 basis points or less, but 
can be higher at times of market stress.  
 We are quite aware of these shortcomings.  However, our object of ultimate 
interest is not the zero-coupon yield curves themselves, but rather the changes in zero-
coupon rates from just before to just after a macro announcement.  Many of these issues 
we cite above are likely to have about the same effect on the yield curve before and after 
the macro announcement, and so will difference out.  For example, unless the macro 
announcement has a large effect on the TED spread, the inappropriate mixing of Treasury 
and eurodollar prices should approximately difference out.  It likewise seems plausible to 
us to assume that the value of the delivery option held by the party on the short side of a 
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Table 1 
U.S. Macroeconomic Announcements 






CPI BLS Monthly 1/21/1987 12/17/2002 % change mom  8:30 
Fed Funds Rate (Target) Fed 8 per year 3/28/1995 12/10/2002 Change in pct pts 14:15 
GDP (Advance Release) BEA Quarterly 4/23/1987 10/31/2002 % change qoq2 8:30 
Housing Starts Census Monthly 2/18/1987 12/17/2002 millions 8:30 
Initial Unemployment Claims ETA Weekly 7/18/1991 12/26/2002 thousands 8:30 
Nonfarm Payrolls BLS Monthly 1/9/1987 12/6/2002 Change in thousands 8:30 
PPI BLS Monthly 1/9/1987 12/13/2002 % change mom 8:30 
Retail Sales Census Monthly 2/12/1987 12/12/2002 % change mom 8:30 
Trade Balance BEA Monthly 2/27/1987 12/18/2002 $ billion 8:30 
Unemployment BLS Monthly 1/9/1987 12/6/2002 % rate 8:30 
1: Acronyms for the sources are as follows: BEA (Bureau of Economic Analysis), BLS (Bureau of Labor Statistics), Census (Bureau 
of the Census), ETA (Employment and Training Administration), Fed (Federal Reserve Board of Governors). 
2: Expressed at an annualized rate. 
Table 2 
High Frequency Tick Data 
 Source Data Starts Data Ends 
Intradaily Futures Tick Data    
Spot Exchange Rates (DEM/EUR, GBP) Olsen 1/1987 12/2002 
10 year US Bond CBOT 11/1988 12/2002 
Eurodollars CME 1/1987 12/2002 
10 year UK Bond LIFFE 1/1987 12/2002 
10 year Bund LIFFE/EUREX 9/1988 12/2002 
Euromark LIFFE 11/1989 12/2002 
Sterling Libor LIFFE 1/1987 12/2002 




Estimated Coefficients in Regression of 20-minute Exchange Rate Returns on Announcement Surprise 
Data Release DM/Euro Pound 
 β R2 β R2 
CPI 3.92 0.00 -5.16 0.00 
Fed Funds Rate -1.23*** 0.20 -0.66*** 0.13 
GDP -13.80*** 0.18 -8.15*** 0.10 
Housing Starts -25.13* 0.02 -15.28 0.01 
Initial Unemployment Claims † -0.16*** 0.04 -0.09*** 0.02 
Nonfarm Payrolls -0.13*** 0.21 -0.10*** 0.21 
PPI -1.23 0.00 -8.37* 0.02 
Retail Sales -14.16*** 0.15 -12.12*** 0.19 
Trade Balance -10.09*** 0.24 -7.13*** 0.20 
Unemployment † -57.51*** 0.07 -48.69*** 0.09 
Notes: This table reports the coefficient in a regression of the returns from 5 minutes before the data release to 15 minutes after the 
release on the surprise component of that data release (equation (1)).  One, two and three asterisks denote significance at the 10%, 5% 
and 1% levels, respectively, using White standard errors.  No constant is included in the regression.  The (uncentered) R-squared from 
each regression is also reported.  A positive exchange rate return denotes dollar depreciation.  Exchange rate returns are continuously 
compounded, multiplied by 10,000.  So the elements of the table can be interpreted as the effect of a one unit surprise on the exchange 






Relative Standard Deviation of Intradaily Asset Price Changes Over Announcement and Non-Announcement Windows 
 
Initial 







DM/Euro 1.31 1.47 2.25 1.34 2.99 2.40 1.53 3.04 1.88 
Pound 1.26 1.44 2.06 1.42 2.63 1.78 1.34 2.71 1.68 
US 3m 1.67 2.60 2.74 2.27 6.26 3.09 2.63 1.68 6.33 
US 1y 1.86 2.79 2.91 2.26 6.72 3.25 3.09 1.46 5.49 
US 2y 1.84 2.70 2.84 2.07 6.40 3.16 3.08 1.31 4.75 
US 5y 1.79 2.67 2.84 1.94 6.21 3.16 3.05 1.28 3.85 
US 10y 1.62 2.37 2.45 1.33 4.54 2.75 2.44 1.36 2.59 
Ge 3m 1.20 1.21 0.99 1.10 1.69 1.47 1.05 1.01  
Ge 1y 1.34 1.52 1.49 1.32 2.74 1.46 1.40 1.13  
Ge 2y 1.38 1.61 1.76 1.31 3.02 1.53 1.53 1.15  
Ge 5y 1.30 1.71 1.89 1.21 3.20 1.72 1.68 1.07  
Ge 10y 1.18 1.63 1.77 1.09 2.92 1.73 1.62 0.93  
UK 3m 1.20 1.05 0.90 2.08 1.35 0.92 0.89 1.22  
UK 1y 0.88 1.10 1.09 0.99 1.73 1.01 1.02 1.07  
UK 2y 0.88 1.08 1.20 0.92 1.83 1.07 1.16 0.87  
UK 5y 1.01 1.35 1.71 0.93 2.07 1.40 1.54 0.67  
UK 10y 0.98 1.31 1.68 0.78 1.75 1.39 1.47 0.58  
Notes: This table reports the standard deviation of intradaily exchange rate returns or changes in zero-coupon interest rates, over the 
20 minutes window around each macro announcement, divided by the corresponding standard deviation over the same window on 
days when there is no macro announcement.  The results for the unemployment release are identical to those for nonfarm payrolls (and 
hence not shown separately) because the unemployment and nonfarm payrolls releases are always simultaneous.  The row labeled US 
10y is the change in the US 10 year zero-coupon interest rate, and the other interest rate rows are labeled analogously. 
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Table 5 
Nyblom Stability Test in Regressions on Macroeconomic Surprises 
 
Initial 






Balance Unemp Fed Funds
DM/Euro 0.23 0.31 0.11 0.07 0.42* 0.11 0.16 7.00*** 0.15 0.22 
Pound 0.44* 0.18 0.06 0.11 0.66** 0.16 0.13 6.98*** 0.09 0.14 
US 3m 0.24 1.45*** 0.33 0.09 2.93*** 2.65*** 0.24 0.04 0.10 0.53** 
US 1y 0.35* 1.32*** 0.15 0.08 1.67*** 2.45*** 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.27 
US 2y 0.42* 1.26*** 0.10 0.11 1.11*** 2.17*** 0.06 0.14 0.06 0.21 
US 5y 0.55** 1.40*** 0.10 0.13 0.69** 1.85*** 0.08 0.36* 0.09 0.23 
US 10y 0.57** 1.40*** 0.16 0.15 0.44* 1.47*** 0.13 0.52** 0.26 0.33 
Ge 3m 0.05 0.56** 0.28 0.05 0.76*** 0.20 0.24 0.26 0.21  
Ge 1y 0.21 0.46* 0.32 0.11 0.22 0.14 0.10 0.42* 0.09  
Ge 2y 0.16 0.48** 0.20 0.13 0.24 0.06 0.05 0.38* 0.11  
Ge 5y 0.06 0.68** 0.04 0.28 0.28 0.16 0.02 0.23 0.10  
Ge 10y 0.13 0.68** 0.01 0.37* 0.25 0.28 0.02 0.63** 0.06  
UK 3m 0.20 0.27 0.45* 0.28 0.08 0.06 0.12 0.12 0.05  
UK 1y 0.15 0.16 0.51** 0.27 0.11 0.07 0.33 0.20 0.05  
UK 2y 0.10 0.12 0.40* 0.25 0.11 0.12 0.28 0.24 0.08  
UK 5y 0.13 0.15 0.25 0.22 0.12 0.13 0.08 0.44* 0.12  
UK 10y 0.25 0.28 0.13 0.17 0.18 0.18 0.05 0.63** 0.17  
Notes: This table reports the Nyblom test for parameter constancy in equation (1).  One, two and three asterisks denote significance at 
the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  
 
Table 6 
Sup F Stability Test in Regressions on Macroeconomic Surprises 
 
Initial 






Balance Unemp Fed Funds
DM/Euro 3.59 5.22 2.59 1.85 8.16* 2.60 4.44 86.45*** 2.96 4.83 
Pound 4.54 7.62* 2.22 3.84 12.49*** 3.80 2.77 85.87*** 1.57 2.34 
US 3m 4.20 14.75*** 4.48 1.23 33.45*** 21.32*** 4.22 2.77 2.89 8.22* 
US 1y 4.55 13.20*** 2.54 1.67 19.36*** 18.95*** 1.96 2.18 2.16 5.64 
US 2y 5.66 15.09*** 1.98 2.83 16.43*** 16.66*** 1.31 3.70 3.07 5.23 
US 5y 7.41* 19.96*** 2.39 2.77 12.86*** 14.92*** 1.33 7.96* 3.97 7.51* 
US 10y 7.30* 21.21*** 3.34 3.06 8.93** 12.90*** 1.82 11.54** 4.12 10.79** 
Ge 3m 1.09 9.24** 8.79* 0.61 14.58*** 3.25 3.20 7.13 7.11  
Ge 1y 4.04 8.40* 9.67** 2.56 3.74 2.16 1.63 14.69*** 1.48  
Ge 2y 3.12 9.89** 6.43 3.08 4.46 1.19 0.68 16.96*** 1.78  
Ge 5y 1.40 11.88** 1.08 3.59 4.57 2.34 0.22 9.75** 1.29  
Ge 10y 2.41 15.51*** 0.33 3.05 4.79 4.60 0.51 12.51*** 0.93  
UK 3m 2.71 3.19 6.21 5.90 3.41 6.14 1.60 4.07 0.59  
UK 1y 2.48 2.65 10.43** 4.12 4.18 1.05 3.59 5.33 1.16  
UK 2y 1.58 2.80 8.49* 5.26 3.13 1.76 3.19 5.16 1.31  
UK 5y 3.84 5.40 5.19 6.11 3.32 2.38 1.92 7.68* 1.89  
UK 10y 5.75 8.67* 2.22 4.56 3.79 2.86 2.31 9.18** 3.09  
Notes: This table reports the sup F test for parameter constancy in equation (1).  One, two and three asterisks denote significance at the 
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